Recently, a criticism of the Yuen protocol (αη scheme) was made. This letter shows that the claim by Nishioka, and Imai group(Mitsubishi and University of Tokyo) is incorrect before they discuss whether αη scheme is quantum or classical. This misunderstanding comes from that these authors disregard the concept of signal detection theory and the basic concept of Y-00.
INTRODUCTION
A quantum key distribution or generation scheme for two legitimate users(Alice and Bob) is one of the most interesting subjects in quantum information science, which was pioneered by C.Bennett and G.Brassard in 1984 [1] . In addition, these remarkable ideas for the key generation protocol have been proposed [2] . We emphasize that such results are great achievement and open a new science. However, many researchers believe that the key distribution by single photon is on the verge of commercial application, despite the fact that the societies of electronics and communication, and of cryptography are basically not interested in the practical use of quantum cryptography based on single photon schemes. Although there is no means of solving such a serious argument, we would like to make the following comment. The key distribution or generation is a very important, but it is very narrow sense that one defines quantum cryptography by only BB-84 and similar principle. Yuen, Kumar, and their group have pointed out that the quantum cryptography should involve other aspects, and called quantum information scientist's attention to quantum cryptography based on another principle. It is clear that the single photon based BB-84 have serious performance limitations [3] , such as possible communication distance and key rate, if the customer wants to use them at modern digital communication network so called super digital highway. The research like Gisin's work [4] to cope with such limitations and coherent state based BB-84 should be encouraged, and also research like Northwestern University's group to investigate another scheme for achieving the same function should be welcome. So we would like to support both types of research.
The purpose of this letter is to make a comment on the recent paper of a criticism of the Y-00 [5] . In cryptography, trials of attack to proposed protocol are essential. So consideration of attack on Y-00 is welcome. But one should follow the basic principle of the proposed protocol, before to attack it. In this sense, the Nishioka et al attacks [5] basically is not grounded on an appropriate theory. As a result, there is misunderstanding for Y-00. We will show their mistakes in this letter. To reader who ask for more fruitful results, we recommend reference 6.
αη SCHEME(YUEN PROTOCOL)
In 2000, Yuen proposed the basis of the present αη scheme which is a new kind of quantum cryptography based on a different principle [7, 8, 9] . In this letter, it is called Y-00 protocol. We should mention first what is basic concept in their idea. There are many fundamental theorems in quantum information theory. The most important theorem for information processing of classical information by quantum states is the following:
Signals with nonorthogonal states cannot be distinguished without error and optimum lower bounds for error rate exist.
This means that if we assign nonorthogonal states for bit values 1 and 0, then one cannot distinguish 1 and 0 without error. When the error probability is 1/2 based on quantum noise, there is no way to distinguish them. Such a theory is called quantum detection theory. On the other hand, in the quantum case, one has to take a quantum attack into account like entanglement or quantum correlation attacks. So one needs the well known quantum no-cloning theorem which was initiated by Wootters 's serial works and quantum duplication theory.
Theorem 2:
Nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned without error.
First,the problem is to establish that the channel between Alice and Eve is very noisy, but the channel of Alice and Bob is kept as a normal communication channel. To realize it, Yuen employed a combination of a shared short key for the legitimate users and a stream cipher. This realizes an advantage distillation. A crucial new ingredient in his protocol is the explicit use of a shared short key for cryptographic objective of secure communication and key generation or expansion. According to the basic concept in his paper, the first application of Y-00 is a direct encryption like stream cipher in the conventional cryptography, and then the key generation or expansion, but not one time pad which is very inefficient communication scheme.
Here we emphasize that one should employ different security criteria for direct encryption and key generation. For direct encryption, we can give the next criteria following conventional cryptography.
Criteria of security for cipher with unavoidable channel noise: Let us turn to Y-00. The data bit is modulated by M -ary cipher driven by pseudo random number generator. So the data bit is mapped into one of M coherent states randomly. The quantum information system is described by a density operator. The density operator of the output of the coding/modulation system of Y-00 as seen by the attack for ciphertext-only individual attack is
where
The probability p i depends on the statistics of the data, and q j , q k depend on the pseudo random number with j, and k being even and odd number, for example.
Eve has to extract the data from the quantum system with such a density operator. However, according to one of the most fundamental theorem(theorem 1) in quantum information theory, the accuracy of Eve's measurement is limited. For ciphertext only attack, the best way of Eve is of course given by the quantum optimum detection for two mixed states :ρ 0 and ρ 1 . As shown in references [8, 9] , the error probability of Eve as determined by the quantum limit is ∼ 1/2 from the appropriate choice of the number M and signal energy [8] . It means that Eve's data is completely inaccurate. In addition, we proposed a Overlap Selection Keying:OSK in references 10 and 11. Each set of basis state is used for {1, 0}, and {0, 1}, depending on sub running key.
So the density operators of 1 and 0 for Eve are ρ 1 = ρ 0 . Eve completely cannot estimate information bits . This is an advantage of OSK. For known/chosen plaintext attack, the best way for Eve is to detect M pure states which convey directly running key sequence. In this case, the accuracy of the data is also given by the quantum detection for M pure states [10, 11] .
Thus, Y-00 is a new type of quantum cryptography. That is, the security is guaranteed by quantum noise , but the system can be implemented by conventional devices. The quantum advantage of Y-00 direct encryption is that one can provide secrecy, for example, against super quantum computer and quantum attacks, for example, the complexity is from 2 |K| in classical to 2 2 |K| in Y-00, |K| ∼ 100.
For key generation, recently Yuen has claimed that the key generation scheme using Y-00(αη scheme) can be unconditionally secure [6] .
THE ATTACK ON Y-00

Noiseless classical system
In this section, we point out that the proposed attack scheme by Nishioka et al [5] on Y-00 does not work even if the system is a completely noiseless classical system. Let us follow the attack scheme. For simplification, we employ one mode coherent state basis. But basically here we do not need quantum signals(coherent state and so on). The attack scheme to Y-00 can be summarized as follows: The phase sift keying scheme used in Y-00 of reference 8 is taken to be
on the phase space, where l i is one of two regions separated by appropriate basis on the phase space. If the appropriate basis is horizontal axis, l 0 is upper plain, l 1 is down plain. r i is true random bit.k i is 0 for even number and 1 for odd number in the running key of M -ary assignment. Eq(4) indeed holds if one knows l i andk i as a matter of tautology. For example,
Let us define the sequences of numbers l, r,k as follows:
Let K, and N be an initial key with length |K|, and length of pseudo random number, respectively. Here we define that N is a set of random sequences of 2 N . One can send the random number bit sequences of 2 |K| with the length N for one of N , which is denoted as R A . Alice sends a sequence R T = R i in N with aK j , j ∈ 2 |K| . Then, a sequence L j , j ∈ 2 |K| is derived.
The proposed attack requires the measurement of L. That is, L is defined by the axis selected on phase space at the first step. Here, let the horizontal axis be the selected axis. So l i(j) is up or down. C + , C − in the attack scheme correspond to even and odd.K j corresponds to pseudo random number sequence which has a number of possibilities of 2 |K| and the length N .
Let R T , L T ,K T be true sequences used and defined on the phase space for Alice and Bob. After measurement of L m , she tries to assign all kind ofK j for her measured sequence L m . So she gets R E based on l i = r i ⊕k i . If the result of the measurement of L m is error free, then it is guaranteed that one of R E is the true random bits sequence.
However, if there is one error for L m by some reasons, then Eve has L T ⊕ e, where e = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, . . .) is error sequence. The position of the error is unknown and uniformly distributed. When Eve applyK j , j ∈ 2 |K| to L T ⊕ e, then it is not guaranteed that the true R T exists in R E . Since Eve does not know the true random bits sequence, she has to try 2 2|K| greater than the initial complexity.
Let us discuss physical system. The problem is that phase spaces of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve are not same. The phase space is formed by the relative phase based on local phases of Bob and Eve. For example, {x c = A cos(φ S − φ L(Bob) ), x s = A sin(φ S − φ L(Bob) )}, {x c = A cos(φ S − φ L(Eve) ), x s = A sin(φ S − φ L(Eve) )}. The Eq(4) is defined for the phase space of Alice-Bob. The attack of Nishioka et al assumes that Eve has the same phase space with that of Alice-Bob. In general Eve does not know the correct phase space. Because, the channel for Alice and Bob has synchronization, but the channel between Alice and Eve does not have the same synchronization. So Eve never understands what is the axis decided by herself, and she never knows what kinds of C − , C + should be used. As a result, R E involves many errors, even when the measurement itself of l i is noiseless. Since obtained data are random number, she has no way to know which bits are incorrect. If the period of the pseudo random number is 2 |K| as in the case of a maximum length linear feedback shift register, then the number of possibilities is ∼ 2
